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Millions of refugees made their way to Europe between 2014 and 2015, with over one
million arriving in Germany alone. Yet, little is known about the impact of this in-
ow on labor markets, crime, and voting behavior. This article uses administrative
data on refugee allocation and provides an evaluation of the short-run consequences
of the refugee inow. Our identication strategy exploits that a scramble for ac-
commodation determined the assignment of refugees to German counties resulting
in exogeneous variations in the number of refugees per county even within states.
Our estimates suggest that migrants have not displaced native workers but have
themselves struggled to nd gainful employment. We nd very small increases in
crime in particular with respect to drug oenses and fare-dodging. Our analysis
further suggests that counties which experience a larger inux see neither more
nor less support for the main anti-immigrant party than counties which experience
small migrant inows.
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1 Introduction
Immigration has become one of the more contentious issues in the public discourse
on policies related to labor markets, crime, trade, and the political economy. The debate
has intensied in light of the recent inow of refugees to European countries. The main
goal of this paper is to use this sharp and unexpected rise in the number of migrants
coming to Germany in 2014/2015 as a natural experiment in order to evaluate its eect
on unemployment, crime, and voting behavior. In this, we build on numerous studies
that have investigated the impact of migration and immigration, often with a focus on
labor market outcomes. Arguably, a consensus has not been reached. For example, Card
(2001) and Dustmann et al. (2013) nd very moderate or insignicant eects of immi-
grant inows on natives wages and employment prospects. Borjas (2003) and Aydemir
and Borjas (2007), on the other hand, show substantial negative eects of immigration on
natives labor market outcomes. These conicting ndings can be explained by dierences
in the model assumptions, in particular the degree to which natives and immigrants are
substitutes (Borjas et al., 2012; Card, 2012). Moreover, the frequently applied spatial
correlations approach, which divides data into cells based on geography and skill levels,
is prone to endogeneity issues not least because immigrants are likely to dierentially
sort into regions that oer them the best employment prospects. As a result, a range
of natural experiments such as the Mariel boatlift (Card, 1990; Borjas, 2015) the reloca-
tion of Algerian repatriats to France (Hunt, 1992), spatial dispersal policies (Edin et al.,
2003; Gould et al., 2004; Damm, 2009), or border openings after the fall of the Berlin
wall (Dustmann et al., 2016) have been exploited to get a better sense of the eect of
immigration on labor market outcomes.
In the context of the eect of immigration on crime, there has been remarkably
little research, studies by Butcher and Piehl (1998) for the US, Bell et al. (2013) for the
UK, and Bianchi et al. (2012) for Italy being notable exceptions. These studies have
found no eects of immigration on violent crime and, at best, moderate eects on prop-
erty crimes. However, Piopiunik and Ruhose (2015) nd a positive association between
crime and immigration in their longitudinal analysis of Germany, the country we study in
this article. Finally, voting behavior and attitudes towards immigrants have been widely
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studied (Dustmann and Preston, 2007, among others). Mayda (2006) shows that individ-
ual skills are strong predictors of attitudes towards immigration. Card (2012) develops
his concept of compositional amenities and shows that concerns about the social eects
of immigration often outweigh concerns about its economic eects.
Our study serves two purposes. First, we contribute to the literature by exploiting
a natural experiment that was created by the allocation mechanisms in Germany during
the refugee crisis in 2014/2015. We show that within states, migrants were allocated to
counties based on reasons unrelated to local labor market conditions or crime levels. In
particular, we provide evidence that neither incomes nor the skill compositions of natives
dier substantially between high and low migration counties. Housing vacancies are also
not signicant determinants of refugee allocations, although it remains conceivable that
the availability of estates that can house a large amount of refugees all in one place, e.g.
abandoned barracks, is a predictor. More importantly, counties that experience small
refugee inows and those with large inows appear to follow identical time trends in
terms of unemployment, crime and voting patterns. This allows us to obtain credibly
causal eects on less stringent identication assumptions.
Second, our study provides a rst evaluation of the short-run consequences of the
refugee crisis in Germany, an event that features prominently in the public discourse.
We exploit a plausibly exogenous source of variation in migrant inows to determine
the eect of these inows on unemployment, crime, and voting behavior. We nd little
evidence for displacement of native workers by refugees. However, our ndings suggest
diculties in integrating refugees into the German labor markets. These diculties are
likely to worsen as more and more migrants become eligible to legally enter the labor
market. Our ndings are consistent with earlier studies for Germany, such as Pischke
and Velling (1997) and D'Amuri et al. (2010), and stand in contrast with Glitz's (2012)
study who exploits the exogenous inow of ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union. His
research design is probably the most similar to ours, although substantial dierences re-
main, not least because the inows in the 1990s were smaller on a per-year basis and
the time horizon Glitz (2012) was able to evaluate was longer. Our study also suggests
that - with the obvious exception of violations to right-of-residence and asylum laws -
there is no association between the number of refugees and the number of street crimes
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in Germany. However, we do nd a statistically signicant relationship between bigger
reception centers and drug crimes and fare-dodging, as well as the number of non-German
suspects in relation with theses crimes. This might partly be driven by higher alertness
of police in these counties. In general, crime only increased marginally more in counties
which received larger refugee inows. Finally, there is no indication that (micro-)exposure
to refugees either increases or decreases propensities to vote for anti-immigrant parties
or aects voter turnout.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide
background information on the refugee crisis and how the German institutional setting
dealt with the inow of hundreds of thousands of migrants in 2014 and 2015. Section 3
introduces our data, in particular the newly collected administrative records that doc-
ument the distribution of migrants across counties. Section 4 describes the empirical
setup and the assumptions our identication strategy is built on. We present our results
in Section 5, discuss them in Section 6 where we also provide a few robustness checks and
conclude in Section 7.
2 Background
In 2011, the year the Syrian civil war erupted, only 50,000 asylum applications
were led in Germany (BAMF, 2016). From 2014 on, more and more people started their
journeys towards Europe. Most of them took the so-called \Balkan route", crossing the
Mediterranean, often on make-shift boats, from Turkey into Greece. From there they
traveled onwards through countries of former Yugoslavia towards Western Europe. In
theory, asylum applications in the European Union (EU) are governed by the Dublin
Regulation which shifts the responsibility of administering an asylum request to the rst
EU member state a migrant sets foot on. In practice, few refugees had any intention of
staying in Greece (or Hungary), but tried to travel on to, among other countries, Austria,
Germany, or Sweden, as these countries promised better living conditions, more gener-
ous welfare benets and better job perspectives. By late summer 2015, amid images of
refugees being stuck in trains and camps in Hungary, the German government is essence
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abandoned the Dublin Regulation and allowed all refugees who had passed through other
EU countries to le for asylum in Germany.
At this point, the inow changed from a steady increase to a large jump in daily
arrival rates, with thousands of new immigrants seeking asylum at the German border
every day. Figure 1 attests to this immigration shock. In 2015 alone 1,091,894 refugees
were registered at the German border (BMI, 2016). The inows were only curtailed when
a deal was forged between the EU and Turkey in early 2016, in which Turkey committed
to crack down on people smugglers in return for e6 billion in aid earmarked for hu-
manitarian support of refugees who have ed to Turkey. The deal eectively closed the
Balkan route. For example, Figure 1 shows that in April 2016 only 15,941 refugees were
registered in Germany.
The aforementioned number of 1,091,894 refugees coming to Germany in 2015 insin-
uates that on the federal level exact data on the number of arrivals exist. Unfortunately
this is only partly true. While every asylum seeker who is picked up by the German
border police undergoes a quick check, the actual registration takes place in separate re-
ception centers. Between quick check and registration, numerous ways to unilaterally exit
the asylum procedure exist. For example, little is known about the number of refugees
who continued their journeys to other countries and left with asylum claims pending. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to collect detailed data on the allocation of
registered asylum seekers to German counties, by obtaining administrative data of the
states and counties. These data unfortunately include no information on refugee char-
acteristics. To this end, the best information to date come from the Federal Oce for
Migration and Refugee's asylum (BAMF) statistics. However, these data are based only
on asylum claims that have been fully processed. For example, in 2015 when about 1.1
million migrants entered the country, only 476,649 asylum applications were processed
which included backlog from 2014 (BAMF, 2016). Based on this information about 69.2
percent of applicants were male, about 31 percent were younger than 18 years old and
only 6.6 percent were older than 45. About 35.9 percent of asylum seekers were from
Syria. About 20 percent were from Albania and Kosovo and only about 0.1 percent of
applications from citizens of these two countries were approved. In fact both countries
were ocially declared \safe countries of origin" in 2015, thus substantially speeding up
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asylum procedures and reducing the inow from these countries. For example, Albania
only accounted for 2 percent of processed asylum applications in April 2016.
The German authorities had a top-to-bottom system in place to deal with refugee
inows. Newly arrived refugees were supposed to be received by the federal police at their
points of entry, often at train stations close to the Austrian border.1 After a quick check
by the federal police, most refugees were placed in short-term facilities for a couple of
days, before being transferred to a federal state with free capacities.2 These allocations
were to follow a quota, the so called \Koenigssteiner Schluessel". This quota is deter-
mined by a state's tax revenues and population, thus ensuring that the costs related to
housing and processing of asylum claims are evenly distributed. Each state runs so called
reception centers (Erstaufnahmeeinrichtungen, EAEs). EAEs tend to have large-scale
housing facilities. Only there, more detailed information was gathered from the prospec-
tive asylum claimers and entered into the EASY System. Applicants are obliged to stay
in their assigned reception center for a period of up to six months during the processing
of their application. Violations of these residential obligations lower the chances of being
granted asylum. After this period, or - more often - if the BAMF decides that the ap-
plication cannot be processed in a timely manner, migrants are redistributed within the
same state to subordinate counties (\Landkreise").3 Due to eciency gains and a lack
of available space, county authorities tend to provide communal accommodations rather
than allowing asylum seekers to seek individual apartments.
An ideal natural experiment would feature an entirely random allocation of refugees
to counties, with some counties receiving large inows and other counties receiving small
inows regardless of their characteristics. The actual quasi-experiment provided by the
refugee crisis at the very least resembles this ideal case and creates exogenous variation
1Even in this rst step, not all refugees could be processed, the BAMF estimates that up to 290,000
persons have not been registered at all.
2The standard procedure provides that new arrivals are transferred to the closest reception center,
where their personal information is entered into EASY, a federal database. The EASY system sub-
sequently allocates new arrivals to one of Germany's 16 states for further processing of their asylum
claims.
3Each state has the authority to distribute asylum seekers to subordinate counties according to its
own legislation (\Rechtsverordnungen"). Usually refugees were supposed to be allocated to counties
commensurate with their population. But all states include a clause in their legislation that allowes
for deviations under extraordinary circumstances. Section 3 will show that invoking theses clauses and
deviating from the scheduled distribution schemes quickly became the norm rather than the exception.
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due to housing shortages and the sheer necessity to relocate refugees from the German
border: refugees were usually transported from border regions in Bavaria to other states
by trains and buses on a daily basis. Deviations of the actual distribution quotas - both
the state-quotas and within-state quotas - were inevitable and mainly arose from housing
capacity shortages and inseparable groups. Due to the overwhelming volume of inows,
state authorities usually simply allocated migrants to counties that had some kind of
accommodation facilities to spare, for example because they happened to be home to
recently abandoned military barracks, or sports halls that could be transformed into
collective accommodations, or recently closed hotels, etc.. The availability of suitable
housing might not be entirely independently distributed across counties but as we will
show in Section 4, the resulting inows were by and large uncorrelated with economic
and social county characteristics. Moreover, allocation decisions were made by state au-
thorities, and within states counties are subject to very similar labor market conditions
and crime ghting strategies.
Several pull and push factors incentivize asylum seekers to stay in their designated
county. For one, asylum seekers are provided with goods and social services at their ac-
commodations or nearby reception centers. Second, refugees are legally obliged to reside
in their assigned accommodations until a decision has been made on their asylum claim.
Violations against this \residence obligation" negatively aect the probability of having
one's asylum claim approved. The average processing time for asylum applications is
about half a year and is highly dependent on an asylum seeker's country of origin and the
types of documents he/she can provide.4 However, an asylum procedure is not usually
initiated immediately upon arrival. Instead an initial \interview" appointment has to be
scheduled which usually involves waiting times of several months. In other words, asylum
seekers are tied to a county for very substantial time. In the meantime, they are legally
prohibited from working, and only once an application is fully approved can they freely
enter the labor market. Ultimately, the scramble to somehow place refugees in what was
often make-shift housing resulted in large dierences in the number of refugees hosted
4According to the federal police only about 20-30 percent of refugees entering the country were in
possession of a passport (GdP, 2015). In general, Syrian asylum seekers, whose applications have a high
probability of being approved, and asylum seekers from the Balkans, whose application have little chance
of being approved, are processed with priority.
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by counties that in other dimensions followed strikingly similar time trends. It is exactly
this source of exogenous variation we exploit in this study.
3 Data
For our analysis, we combine several data sources, the most important of which
are administrative records by the 16 German states on the allocation of refugees to the
402 subordinate German counties. These records are usually maintained by the states'
internal aairs ministries, or in some instances by a state-run agency that supervises the
allocation of refugees to the counties. While the German freedom of information act
(\Informationsfreiheitsgesetz") only applies to federal agencies, most states have similar
laws in place and the competent authorities in all 16 states provided records on the as-
signment of refugees to counties in the years 2014 and 2015 for all 16 states.5 By and
large, all states abided to the same reporting standards, making those data comparable
across states.
Aside from coordinating the transfer of migrants to counties and communities, states
also run the above mentioned large-scale reception centers (EAEs). We obtained detailed
information on the location and capacities of these EAEs directly from the competent
authorities of 8 states. 4 other states pointed us to their website where the same infor-
mation could be retrieved. For the three city states - Berlin, Hamburg und Bremen -
which are equally state and county, there is no clear distinction between state-run EAEs
and county-level accommodations.
Table 1 shows the number of migrants that were allocated to the counties by the
states according to our data in 2014-15. It is notable that these numbers are more or
less in line with the shares of refugees that were supposed to be received by states by
virtue of the federal quota. For example, Germany's most populous state, Northrhine-
Westphalia (NRW) was due to receive 21.21 percent of refugees entering the country,
according to the federal key. In our data about 23.2 percent of refugees were allocated to
5One state provided data only for 2015. The 2014 data were imputed based on the absolute number
of refugees allocated to this state and assuming an distribution across counties that is identical to that
of 2015.
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NRW counties. Note that the allocated percentage do not necessarily have to be identical
to the federal quota since some of the federally allocated migrants might be housed in
state-run EAEs rather than allocated to the counties. This is especially true for Bavaria
through which most immigrants who took the Balkan route entered the country; simi-
larly, Baden-Wuertemberg and Hesse have large (state-administered) EAE capacities and
correspondingly somewhat lower county allocations.
As mentioned in Section 2, federal data on the number of registered asylum seekers are
scarce and often incomplete.6 In light of this, our data is the best estimate of county-
allocations of refugees to date and probably draws a more accurate picture of refugee
allocations than the federal data base could. Despite the issues with federal data in gen-
eral and the EASY system in particular, it is comforting that the data provided by the
states are roughly consistent with the federal allocation key.
Based on the administrative records provided by the states, we calculate the number
of allocated refugees per 100,000 inhabitants for each county. Figure 2 illustrates that
there is quite a bit of variation across counties, even within states. Crosses indicate the
presence of an EAE in a county. In some instances, counties in which a particularly large
state-run EAE has been set up were allocated fewer migrants. Other than that there is
no obvious, discernible pattern in the allocation of refugees within states, although some
states certainly achieve a more even allocation across counties than others. Yet, a fair
amount of variation remains (the average refugee allocation is 1,088 per 100,000 inhab-
itants with a standard deviation of 378). This is vital for our study which will exploit
county dierences in refugee allocations to isolate the eect of additional refugee inows
on labor market, crime, and election outcomes.
Put dierently, our identication strategy (more details are provided in Section
4), requires that refugee allocations are independent of any time trends in the residu-
als (\common time trend assumption"). In order to investigate whether this identifying
assumption is met, we split our sample into high and low migration counties. High mi-
gration counties are dened as counties which host an EAE with a capacity of at least
200 beds or have been allocated more than 1,260 refugees per 100,000 inhabitants, which
6The EASY system has also been widely criticized for containing duplicates and migrants that con-
tinued their journey to other countries.
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puts them roughly into the 25th percentile in terms of this measure. This rule achieves
a 50:50 split into high and low migration counties.
Unemployment data are provided by the Federal Labor Oce on a quarterly basis
from 1/2005 to 1/2016. Figure 4 plots the unemployment rates separately for the general
population and for non-German workers. Three things stand out. First, unemployment
rates for non-Germans are substantially higher than for the \native" population. The
non-German unemployment rate also warrants a closer look as newly arrived job seekers
might be better substitutes for existing foreign workers, thus exacerbating an existing
lack of integration into the labor market for this particular group. And indeed, there
is a notable increase in foreign unemployment in the rst quarter of 2016. However,
at rst glance, this increase seems only slightly more pronounced in counties with high
refugee inows than in those with low inows. Second, no such up-tick is obvious for
overall unemployment. This is a rst indication that overall unemployment has not been
much aected by refugee inows. Figure 3b supports this notion by plotting changes in
unemployment rates between the rst quarter of 2013 and the rst quarter of 2016 for all
counties. A comparison with Figure 3a, indicates that changes in unemployment are for
the most part uncorrelated with migrant inows. Finally, Figure 4 shows that unemploy-
ment levels tend to be slightly higher in counties that receive a large migrant inux. But
more importantly, there is no dierence in unemployment trends in the pre-treatment
period. Both low migration counties and high migration counties experience the same
seasonality patterns and have experienced the same decline in unemployment throughout
the 2000s and 2010s.
We also obtained data on criminal activity and criminal suspects which are released
by the Federal Criminal Police Oce on an annual basis. Figure 5a plots trends in re-
ported crimes separately for high and low migration counties. The graph reveals a large
increase in the number of criminal oenses per 100,000 inhabitants in 2014 and 2015 when
the refugee crisis was in full swing. At rst blush, this might suggest that the refugee
crisis was accompanied by a crime epidemic. However, much of this increase can be ex-
plained by an increase in violations related to asylum and right-of-residence laws. By
denition, any refugee who enters Germany on the land route will be in violation of the
Dublin Regulation, although in practice few of these violations were actually recorded.
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What is more, asylum seekers whose applications were rejected and who remain in the
country illegally will inate these numbers. Once we adjust the time series by discarding
these types of oenses, the up-tick in crime disappears, in fact the crime rate seems to
have not budged at all.7
More important for our identication strategy is that the number of committed
crimes follows very similar pre-crisis time trends in low and high migration counties.
This also holds true when we look at dierent categories of crime. For example, the
number of street crimes (bag-snatching, bike thefts,...) declined to the same extent dur-
ing pre-treatment period in counties that were to experience large and small migrant
inows in 2014/2015 (see Figure 5b). Likewise, the number of drug-related oenses ap-
pears to have remained at in both types of counties. Figure 3c which shows the change
in aggregate crime (adjusted for asylum and right-of-residence law transgressions) lends
further support to the notion that dierential migrant inuxes appear to be unrelated
with changes in crime rates.
The refugee crisis has also had profound impacts on the political landscape in Ger-
many. Therefore, we collected data on vote shares and polls for Germany's largest anti-
immigration party, \Alternative fuer Deutschland" (AfD). The AfD party was founded in
early 2013. At the time, its main platform was opposition to the Euro and the Euro zone
bailouts. Figure 6 shows bi-weekly AfD party polls. The rst vertical line indicates the
2013 federal election in which the AfD party received 4.7percent of votes, thus failing to
clear the constitutional 5percent threshold to receive any seats in the federal parliament.
Over time, the AfD party's focus arguably turned from Euro-scepticism towards immi-
gration. The second dashed vertical line is placed at 5 September 2015. On this day the
German chancellery allowed the entry, by train, of hundreds of refugees who had been
detained and were stuck in Hungary. This event is widely seen as the beginning of the
refugee crisis with migrant inows intensifying in the following weeks and months. It also
seems to have been associated with an increase in approval for the AfD party which ever
since has consolidated its position. In fact, national polls understate the electoral success
7It should be noted that we could only adjust the time series for 2014 and 2015 since transgressions
of asylum and right-of-residence laws were not reported on a per-county-basis prior to 2014. However,
in 2013 these oenses only accounted for 1.85percent of all oenses nationwide, so that the amount of
(downward) bias that is induced by this adjustment should be negligible.
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the AfD party has had. It received between 15.1 and 24.3 percent of votes cast in early
2016 state election. Polls are not taken at the county level, so that we cannot track and
compare AfD party support by \treatment intensity", i.e. across high and low migration
counties. Instead, we will evaluate whether - within states that held state-elections in
2016 - the electoral success of the AfD party has increased dierentially in counties that
experienced large migrant inows relative to the party's performance in the 2013 federal
election. Consequently, only a subset of counties (those in states that held state elections
in 2016) can be evaluated. If Figure 3d is any indication, then inows of refugees are no
important predictors of the AfD party's electoral success which is a result that will be
conrmed by our regression analysis in Section 5.
Finally, the 2011 Zensus provides us with a variety of county characteristics. Each
county's population, per capita GDP (in e), a county's age structure, the share of the
population with migration background, the share of the population with a college or vo-
cational degree and the number of housing vacancies (per 1,000 county inhabitants) were
sampled.8 We will use these characteristics to explore to what extent the allocation of
refugees to counties constitutes an exogeneous shock. Table 2 indicates that high mi-
gration and low migration counties dier only marginally along observable dimensions.
For example, 74.2percent of the population in high migration counties have a college or
vocational degree which is similar to the 73.0percent in low migration counties. The only
notable dierence is that per capita GDP in 2011 was higher in counties that were to
experience large migrant inows. This should not be surprising since the federal alloca-
tion quota arranges for larger contingents to be allocated to economically more powerful
states. We will see in Section 4 that once state specic characteristics are accounted for,
these dierences by and large disappear.
4 Methodology
All ve data sources - administrative state records on refugee allocations and EAE
capacities, unemployment rates as provided by the Federal Labor Oce, the Federal
8Only the population estimates are updated annually, all other county covariates are only available
as of 2011, i.e. lagged and without time variation. This issue will receive more attention in Section 4.
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Criminal Police Oce's crime data, ocial federal and state election outcomes, and
Zensus 2011 results are subsequently matched with one another at the county level. For
each outcome, we have at least one observation per county prior to the refugee crisis in
2013 and one observation pertaining to either 2015 or 2016. As the number of refugees
assigned to a certain county potentially depends on the share of asylum seekers the county
received before, we include data for 2014 refugee distribution. That is, we pool the 2014
and 2015 gures, in order to create a comprehensive measure of refugee inows.9 This
gives rise to a specication of the following form:
yct = c + D2015=16 + 1D2015=16  refc + 2D2015=16  EAEc + ct (1)
where yct is a measure of our three outcomes of interest - unemployment rate, crime rate,
and AfD party vote share - in county c at time t. c denotes a full set of county dummies,
D2015=16 is an indicator for the post-treatment period. Our coecients of interest are
1 and 2, which are related to interactions of the post-treatment dummy, D2015=16, and
the number of refugees that were allocated to a county between 1 January 2014 and 31
December 2015, refc, and the EAE capacities, EAEc , that were put into operation over
the same time period. 1 thus measures to what extent counties which experienced a
larger inux of refugees have experienced larger increases in unemployment, crime, and
voting behavior.
Our empirical setup diers from a classic dierence-in-dierences setup in two ways.
First, all units of observations receive the treatment (i.e. inows of migrants) but the
intensity of this treatment diers across counties.10 Second, we only observe outcomes at
two points in time. Once in the pre-treatment period and once in post-treatment period
respectively.11 That is, unemployment rates are evaluated in the rst quarter of 2013 and
the rst quarter of 2016; we evaluate changes in crime from 2013 to 201512; and changes
9As a robustness check, we later also treat the 2015 and 2014 inow separately and evaluate how
changes in inows between these two years are associated with changes in outcomes.
10In terms of this feature, our study resembles the prominent work of Acemoglu et al. (2004) who
investigate the eect of dierential mobilization rates across US states during World War II on female
labor supply.
11In this respect, the empirical setup of our study resembles Card and Krueger's (1994) seminal study
on the eect of the minimum wage increase in New Jersey.
12Note that 2016 county level crime data will only become available over the course of 2017.
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in the AfD vote share from the federal election in September 2013 to the state elections in
early 2016 for the counties that are located in states that held a state election. With just
two observations per county, equation 1 is equivalent to a rst-dierencing specication
of the following form:
4yc = 0 + 1refc + 2EAEc(+Xc) + c (2)
where4yc measures the change in outcome yc. Note that 1 and 2 in equation 2 by
denition must be equal to the same coecients in equation 1 and thus still measure the
impact of dierential migrant inows on our outcomes of interest. This specication has
the advantage of allowing us to explicitly include time-invariant county-level covariates:
Xc denotes county characteristics such as GDP per capita, average age of the population,
share of the population with a migration background and a college or vocational degree,
and the number of housing vacancies (per 1,000 inhabitants), all of which are per Zensus
2011.
One major challenge to our interpretation of the relationship between refugee in-
ows on the one hand, and unemployment, crime, and voting behavior changes on the
other hand, is that high and low migration counties might dier along dimensions that
predict dierential refugee allocations. For example, if refugees were primarily allocated
to counties in economic decline, our model would pick up spurious, positive correlation
between unemployment and refugee inows. In an ideal empirical setup, on the other
hand, refugees would be randomly assigned to counties, thus creating dierential ex-
ogenous shocks. The institutional setup in Germany provided for neither a negatively
selective nor random assignment of refugees to counties. After all, allocation quotas re-
quire economically stronger states to absorb larger inows. Nonetheless, Table 3 shows
that after controlling for state xed eects, only one of our observable county charac-
teristics is an individually signicant (at the 5percent level) predictor of the number of
refugees allocated to a county and the size of this eect is moderate at best. In other
words, within-state refugee inows into a county are mostly uncorrelated with observable
county characteristics. It should be stressed that our empirical setup does not (even)
require this very strong assumption of random refugee inows to hold. Equation 2 will
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yield an unbiased estimate of the dierential eect of migrant inows as long as the resid-
uals in low migration and high migration counties are subject to the same time trends.
Figures 4 and 5 support this common time trend assumption. Still, the fact that few of
our observable characteristics are signicant predictors of refugee inows experienced by
the counties lends additional support to this identifying assumption.
It is also notable that in Table 3 housing vacancies are no signicant predictors
of refugee allocations. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the presence of a sin-
gle large property that allows for the accommodation of many refugees in one facility,
e.g. former army (\Bundeswehr") barracks, might be a strong predictor of immigrant
inows. Unfortunately, there seems to exist no conclusive list of abandoned barracks, so
that we cannot entirely dismiss the notion that the presence of such a property leads to
non-random allocations of refugees across counties.13 Even if having hosted a military
base in, say, the 1980s was associated with larger refugee inows today, this would only
threaten the validity of our estimates if barracks had been closed selectively and closures
had dierential eects on our outcomes of interest. In light of the fact that with the end
of the cold war barracks all over the country became obsolete and were closed, such a
narrative seems unlikely.
5 Results
5.1 Refugees and Unemployment
Our regression analysis estimates the dierential eect of migrant inows, i.e.
whether counties with high migration inow experience larger increases in unemploy-
ment, crime, and voter turnover. Our descriptive statistics in Table 2 suggest that this
is hardly the case. In both low and high migration counties unemployment actually de-
creased slightly.
The results in Table 4 conrm this nding. If anything, local unemployment rates
13There is a surprisingly detailed list of several hundred abandoned Bundeswehr properties on
Wikipedia. According to this list, virtually all West-German counties are home to a former army,
navy, or air-force base. However, the Bundeswehr could not conrm the accuracy nor the completeness
of said list. Nor is there any information on which facilities are suitable for accommodation.
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and migrant inows are negatively related although this relationship is neither statis-
tically nor economically signicant once covariate controls are included. Nor have the
presence or the capacities of a reception center any inuence on the overall unemploy-
ment rate. The same is true for the unemployment rate of youths aged 15 to 25 (see
columns (3) and (4) of Table 4). The vast majority of working-age migrants are between
16 and 25 years old and they will often look for apprenticeships or entry level positions
which may put them into competition with young native workers (BAMF, 2016). Even
so, our estimates suggests that there is little in the way of a displacement eect.
Another group of potential substitutes are non-German workers and pre-crisis im-
migrants, many of whom may possess similar skill sets. And indeed, larger inows of
migrants are associated with increases in the unemployment rate for workers who are not
German citizens. Column (8) of Table 4 suggests that a one standard deviation increase
in migrant inows is associated with a 1.2 percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate for foreigners. Given the 2013 average unemployment rate for this group, this esti-
mate translates into about a 7.6 percent increase. There are two plausible explanations
for this striking increase in non-German unemployment. For one, refugees may have dis-
placed some non-German workers and pushed them into unemployment. This may very
well have happened through the shadow economy as refugees can only legally enter the
workforce once their asylym claim has been approved.14.
A second explanation is that recently arrived refugees themselves start to show up
in the unemployment statistics. This would indicate diculties of the German labor
market to immediately absorb this inux of additional job seekers. There is some evi-
dence supporting this causal chain. On the county level, no information on the country
of origin of job seekers is available; yet such information is compiled on the federal level.
Figure 7 plots these data. On the left-hand side y-axis we measure the overall number
of non-German job seekers. Between the third quarter of 2015 - which is also the time
when substantial numbers of refugees should have started to receive work permits - and
the rst quarter of 2016 about 150,000 additional non-German job seekers registered with
the Federal Employment Agency. During the same time period the number of job seekers
14There is an alternative route for refugees to obtain a work permit. However, this route is subject to
a complex approval process which among other things involves a priority check of whether there is no
other job seeker from an EU country who is potentially being displaced.
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from the eight main crisis countries (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria,
Eritrea, and Somalia) increased by roughly the same number, indicating that the absolute
increase in non-German unemployment is mostly driven by recent refugees seeking work.
Note that the data underlying Figure 7 use a dierent denition of unemployment and
include workers who are part of government-sponsored programs, e.g. to enhance their
skills. The county-level data underlying Table 4, on the other hand, would not count job
seekers who are taking part in active labor market policy programs as unemployed. The
simultaneous increase in non-German unemployment and unemployment of citizens from
the main crisis countries is striking. It indicates that our regression estimate does not
pick up displacement eects. Instead, our result might best be interpreted as evidence for
diculties of migrant workers to quickly integrate into the German labor market. These
diculties appear to be quite substantial. For example in all of 2015 only 137,136 people
were granted asylum and thus received a work permit (2014 total was 31,025). In early
2016 processing speed picked up and 92,577 asylum claims were approved in the rst
three months of 2016. The magnitude of the increase in unemployment indicates that
many of those who have obtained a work permit by way of an approved asylum claim
struggled to nd employment. This problem appears to be particularly grave considering
that not everybody who was granted asylum intends to become part of the labor force.
For example, the BAMF estimates that about two thirds of Syrian women are neither in
employment nor looking for work (Worbs and Bund, 2016). Similarly, many minors who
were granted asylum are more likely to attend school than show up in the unemployment
statistics. Hence, the marked increase in non-native unemployment which parallels the
increase in the number of immigrants who were granted asylum (and thus became eligible
to work) indicates substantial diculties of the German labor market to absorb this labor
supply shock, at least in the short-run. Not surprisingly these diculties tend to be more
pronounced in counties that received larger refugee inows.
5.2 Refugees and Crime
Table 5 shows the eects of refugee inows on crime rates. Panel A looks at the
aggregate crime rate (per 100,000) and is adjusted for the natural increase in oenses
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related to immigration and asylum laws. Even after immigration oenses are excluded
from the crime statistics, the number of refugees allocated to a county is signicantly
and positively associated with increases in crime (see columns (1) and (2) of Panel A in
Table 5). A one-standard deviation increase in migrant inow is associated with about 95
additional crimes per 100,000. Given a mean of 6,417 crimes per 100,000, this translates
into roughly a 1.5 percent increase. Since 2013, the ocial crime statistics distinguish be-
tween German and non-German crime suspects. While refugees only make up a fraction
of the non-German population, increases in the number of crime cases with non-German
main suspects would support the hypothesis of immigration induced increases in crime.
We indeed nd a positive association between larger migrant inows and the number of
non-German suspects. Yet again, these are very moderate in size. Columns (5)'s and
(6)'s coecients suggest that a 1 standard deviation increase in refugee allocations in-
crease the number of cases involving a non-German suspect by about 54 (mean is 625).
Hence, these increases - while not negligible - show no sign of exploding crime rates.
Aggregate crime statistics also contain all types of oenses ranging from very se-
rious crimes, such as assault, to smaller transgressions such as fare-dodging. We thus
separately evaluate dierent types of crime. For example, street crimes account for a
little less than a quarter of crimes in Germany and include all oenses that take place
in the public sphere such as handbag-snatching, damages to motor vehicles, theft from
kiosks and show windows, bike-nicking, breaking of vending machines, and (attempted)
robberies of money vans. Our regression analysis detects no dierential increases in these
crimes in counties that host more refugees. Nor is there any indication that the number
of non-German suspects for street crimes is associated with migrant inows. Our results
for drug-related crimes are displayed in Panel C of Table 5. We nd large and statis-
tically signicant eects for EAE capacities. 200 extra beds per 100,000 inhabitants,
which is roughly the average county capacity, are associated with an increase of about
4.4 drug oense in a county. The mean number of drug oenses (per 100,000) in our
sample is 317.74, so this estimate suggests that the presence of an average-sized EAE
is associated with an increase in drug-related crime of about 1.4 percent. Interestingly
enough, our analysis of suspects in cases involving a drug oense suggests that the pres-
ence of a reception center is associated with signicant increases in both the number of
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German and non-German suspects. An increase in 200 reception center beds increases
the number of German suspects by 2.90 (mean: 231.04) and the number of non-German
suspects by 1.1 (mean: 47.00). In absolute terms, much of the increase in drug-related
crimes is therefore driven by \native criminals", although in relative terms the increase
in non-German suspects for drug-related crimes is more pronounced. Of course, we have
no way of knowing how many of the non-German suspects are recent refugees.15 In other
words: while our result indicate that counties with larger EAE have seen larger increases
in drug-related crimes, we cannot conclude with certainty that refugees were the oenders
in those crimes. Our results do, however, provide suggestive evidence that EAEs might be
potential \hotspots" for drug oenses, although it is also conceivable that the authorities
have devoted more resources to policing these areas so that crimes are more likely to be
recorded in the rst place. Panel D evaluates fare-dodging oenses. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that these have become more common, and indeed we nd a positive correlation
between EAE capacities and the number of oenses and the number of non-German sus-
pects. Yet again, these are relatively small eects. An increase in the number of EAE
spots increases the number of faredodging oenses by about 2 percent and the number
of non-foreign suspects by about 8 percent.16
5.3 Refugees and Voting Behavior
An analysis of voting behavior is complicated by the fact that elections do not take
place every year or even quarterly. The last federal election in Germany took place in
September 2013, the next federal election will take place in 2017. Three elections for
state parliaments took place in early 2016 in Baden-Wuertemberg, Rhineland Palatinate,
and Saxony-Anhalt; municipal elections (at the county level) took place around the same
time in Hesse. Our main outcome of interest is the vote share for the anti-immigrant
AfD party. We also analyze election turnout and evaluate the support for the incumbent
15In contrast to the unemployment data, publicly available federal crime statistics do not report
suspects by nationality which may have been informative in this respect.
16Note that we also evaluated other crime types and found similar results for the number of property
damages, violent crimes in general and assaults in particular. These results are available from the authors
upon request.
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party which appoints a state's prime minister. The AfD party did not exist at the time
of the last state elections in the aforementioned states. Therefore, we rely on the 2013
federal election outcomes as a proxy for the AfD party's baseline support prior to the
refugee crisis. Furthermore, the Afd party changed its political focus between 2013 and
2016 from opposition to the Euro bailouts towards migration issues, so our results have
to be interpreted with some caution.
Table 6 shows no statistically signicant eect of refugee inows or EAE capacities
on the electoral success of the AfD party. Of course, this is not to say that the refugee
crisis has not helped the AfD party in achieving larger electoral success. Figure 6 strongly
suggests that gains in approval are driven by concerns about immigration. Our results,
however, indicate that these gains were no more pronounced in counties that actually
received larger inows than in those with smaller inows of migrants. In other words, di-
rect (micro-) exposure to migrants neither increase nor decrease a county's constituents'
propensity to cast their votes for the AfD party. Figure 3d is a case in point. The AfD
party was particularly successful in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt. This success
was, however, not accompanied by large refugee inows to Saxony-Anhalt. Rather, both
far-left and far-right parties tend to traditionally fare better in East-Germany than in
the West. Our results hold up, regardless of whether the municipal elections in Hesse -
which may be deemed less important than state elections and saw a turnout of just 48
percent - are included in the sample. Controls for county level characteristics also do not
change the results.17
We also nd no indication that more voters took to the ballots in counties with
larger refugee inows. In fact, turnout is by and large uncorrelated with refugee inows.
However, our results indicate that the incumbent party suered heavier losses in counties
with larger immigrant inows than in those with small inows. In fact, column (7) of
Table 6 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in refugee inows is associated
with a loss of 4.5 percentage points in the share of votes cast for the incumbent party.
Our results stand in contrast to a study by Steinmayr (2016) who found that Austrian
17Voting districts do not always align with county borders. We are grateful to the statistical oces of
the states to aggregate the election results to the county level for us.
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districts with large refugee presence were less likely to vote for anti-immigration parties.18
Barone et al. (2016), on the other hand, nd that larger immigrant inows are associated
with better election outcomes for center-right parties.19 It should, however, be stressed
that our results only rely on a small subset of all German states and counties. It will,
therefore, be of interest to analyze future elections.
6 Discussion and Sensitivity
Our paper provides a rst evaluation of the refugee inow to Germany in 2014-
2015. It is necessarily an analysis of short-run eects. As such, there is no guarantee that
trends we have uncovered in this study will hold in the long-run. Even over the course
of conducting this study, new events in Germany and abroad have occurred that might
shape debates and policies. Nonetheless, our analysis of short-term eects provides inter-
esting insights that might contribute to an evidence-based debate on the economic and
social eects of large migrant inows in general and the consequences of the recent wave
of refugees in particular. In a nutshell, our analysis suggests: migrants did not displace
natives; crime only marginally increased with larger refugee inows; and dierential expo-
sure to refugees is largely uncorrelated with support for anti-immigration parties. At the
same time, our results indicate that the labor supply shock induced by the refugee crisis
has not yet been fully absorbed by the German labor market. The identifying assump-
tion under which these results are most credible is that trends in employment, crime, and
voting behavior would have been the same in high migration counties as in low migration
counties in the absence of refugee inows. We have provided evidence that suggests that
this is a fair assumption to make. Placebo tests provide another piece of evidence for
the validity of our identication strategy. For that purpose, we move the time window
of analysis into a time-period that was unaected by the refugee crisis. Specically, we
re-estimate equation 2 for the years 2011 and 2013 (rather than 2013 and 2015/16) and
18Of course, both the party platforms and the setup of the refugee allocation mechanism are dierent
in Austria.
19Again, this comparison is slightly awed since Barone et al. (2016) evaluate a pre-crisis time period,
have much more detailed data on immigration (for over 8,000 districts), and evaluate voting shares for
more established anti-immigration parties in Italy
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attribute the refugee inows that actually took place in 2014/15 to the year 2012/13.20
Our results for this analysis are displayed in Table 7. We cannot detect any eect
of our placebo refugee inows on the overall unemployment rate, youth unemployment,
or unemployment of non-Germans. This is comforting for two reasons. First, it lends
additional credibility to our zero eect nding for overall and youth unemployment rates.
Second, our nding that larger inows of refugees are associated with increases in non-
German unemployment does not appear to be driven by the fact that counties with large
inows were on a dierent unemployment trajectory prior to the start of the refugee cri-
sis.
Admittedly, our placebo results for crime are somewhat less convincing. It appears
as if counties that were to absorb larger migrant inows had been on a slight downward
trajectory in terms of overall crime. Fortunately, there is little evidence for such a down-
ward trajectory for drug oenses where the coecients on our placebo refugee variable
are negative but insignicant. Recall that for drug oenses, we found a positive associa-
tion with EAE capacities, and here our placebo test is comforting in that it suggests that
the crime rate trajectory was similar across counties which did and those that did not
become EAE sites.21 By and large, our placebo tests lend additional credibility to our
results for unemployment and indicate that we might slightly underestimate the eect
of refugee inows on crime although the amount of bias is relatively small. There is no
evidence for large undetected eects on crime or even a \crime epidemic" due to refugee
inows.
From a policy point of view, the results of our analysis of short-run labor market
eects is a mixed bag. On the one hand, there is little indication for a displacement of
native workers by immigrants. On the other hand, refugees do not appear to be readily
absorbed into the labor market, at least in the short time period that we are able to ob-
serve. It is conceivable that the relative inexibility of the German labor market (relative
to the US or UK) might be an obstacle to a quick labor market integration of immigrant
20Obviously, we cannot conduct this exercise for our voting behavior outcome as the AfD party was
only founded in February 2013.
21A placebo analysis separately for German and Non-German suspects is unfortunately not feasible; on
the county level this distinction was made for the rst time in 2013. Neither can we analyze fare-dodging
behavior as this type oense was not reported on a county-level basis prior to 2013.
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workers. Ager and Bruckner (2013) show that this might result in large unemployment
eects. Our results lend some support to calls for additional labor market exibility
(Bonger et al., 2015). Another reason for the slow integration of migrants into the labor
market might be skill mismatches. Woessmann (2015) estimates that about two thirds
of recent arrivals have \not been suciently educated to participate in a modern soci-
ety". This rather awe-inspiring assessment suggests that Figure 7 shows by no means the
end of the story, i.e. further increases in foreign unemployment are to expected if more
and more unskilled workers enter the labor force. At the very least our results suggest
that the unemployment rates of crisis country nationals should be closely tracked, data
on the qualications of migrants need to be collected, and - especially if the aforemen-
tioned estimates about the skill level distribution turn out to be correct - training and
re-qualication eorts will have to be stepped up.
There is also little indication for large increases in crime, at least within the time
period that is covered by our data. Crime rates are generally at in particular for street
crimes, although we nd a small uptick in drug related oenses and fare-dodging in coun-
ties that host receptions centers. Two other types of crimes that have received substantial
public interest could, unfortunately, not be fully evaluated in this study. First, anecdotal
evidence suggests that crimes against refugees, and arson attacks against accommoda-
tion facilities in particular, are on the rise. Crime statistics do not separately report
arson attacks specically aimed at refugee accommodations. The number of arson cases
in Germany actually declined between 2013 and 2015 from 20,009 to 19,251 reported
incidents.22 County level data is only available for 2015 (and not 2013). We ran a cross-
sectional analysis and did not nd evidence that arsons are more frequent in counties
that received a larger inow of migrants or have larger EAE capacities.
In the same vein, the 2015/16 new year's eve events in Cologne during which
many women were assaulted by men of Arab or North African appearance, have led
to a widespread perception that sex crimes committed by refugees have become a major
issue. Unfortunately, we can shed little light on this debate. The Cologne events will only
show up in the 2016 crime data which will not become available any time soon. County
level data of these types of oenses have only recently been collected so that, again, we
22This includes not just actual arson attacks but also the criminal act of creating re hazards.
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can merely conduct a cross-sectional analysis for 2015. Such an analysis fails to nd any
statistically signicant association between the number of refugees that were allocated
to a county and the number of sex crimes in said county.23 As a nal robustness check,
we use the dierence in refugees and EAE capacities from 2014 to 2015 as explanatory
variables (see Table 8). This boils down to a comparison of county-level changes in out-
comes with changes in refugee inows between 2014 and 2015. The results are generally
consistent with our previous ndings. In particular, we still observe an increase in foreign
unemployment of similar magnitude.
7 Conclusion
The inow of more than a million refugees to Germany in 2014/15 continues to
inuence the German economy and society. It also represents a unique natural experiment
that allows for an investigation of labor market, crime, and voting behavior eects of
immigrant inows. We analyze the short-term impacts of this largely unanticipated
shock and make three related contributions.
First, our results are highly relevant for policy makers. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the rst study to evaluate the labor market eects of a key event that has shaped
public discourse throughout the world. We show that a signicant labor supply shock
of low skilled prime-age workers has not had much of a displacement eect on native
workers. At the same time, our analysis raises some concerns about the ability of the
German labor market to absorb this supply shock. This paper is, of course, an analysis of
short-term eects. At this early stage in the post-inow period, our results suggest that
policy makers need to devote more resources to labor market integration of migrants.
Together with other measures designed to ease the entry of refugee job seekers into the
job market, this should help to avoid further increases in non-native unemployment and
the associated adverse economic and societal consequences. At the very least, the job
seeking experience of eligible refugees needs to be monitored more closely. While we
cannot entirely rule out a displacement of native workers in the long-run, there is little
23The results for both sex crimes and arson attacks are available from the authors upon request.
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sign of this as of now.
With respect to crime rates, we nd at best muted increases in criminal activity.
Again, these are short-run eects and continued monitoring of the situation is warranted.
In particular, the release of quarterly or even monthly (rather than annual) crime data
might help in this respect. Moreover, we neither want to discount nor emphasize the
degree to which attempted and actual terrorist attacks have been aected by refugee
inows and have taken a strain on police and counter-terrorism resources. But, given the
data available for non-terrorism related crime and given the time period for which said
data were available, there is little evidence for large increases in crime in the immediate
aftermath of refugee inows. Lastly, while the rise of the anti-immigration AfD party is
undeniable, there is little indication that counties that experience larger migrant inows
largely vote for said party. However, we nd some evidence for a negative association
between support for the governing party and the number of refugees assigned to a county.
A second contribution of this paper is the collection of unique county-level data on
migrant inows. The data are made available in the appendix of this paper and should
be tremendously useful to other researchers. For instance, an obvious avenue for future
research is the analysis of labor supply shocks on native wages. The data collected for
our study will also be helpful in learning more about immigrant sorting as eventually
migrants are no longer required to reside in the counties that they were initially allocated
to.
Finally, our study deploys a research design that is based on a credible natural
experiment. As such it advances the literature on labor market impacts of immigration,
sheds additional light on the link between immigration and crime, and provides insights on
the eect of immigration on voting behavior. Of course, the natural experiment created
by refugee inows to Germany diers markedly from other natural experiments that have
been evaluated in the past. The sheer size of the refugee inows in such a short time period
is unprecedented and has created unique problems in terms of the provision of adequate
accommodation, schooling, and social services. Moreover, the presumed skill composition
as well as language and cultural barriers might adversely aect both economic and social
integration. That is in contrast to, say, the relocation of ethnic Germans after the fall of
the Soviet Union who shared the language and culture of their host country (Glitz, 2012)
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or the relocation of Cuban migrants to Miami in the wake of the Mariel boatlift (Card,
1990). Some of the migration in our natural experiment might also be of transient nature
as a fair number of asylum seekers may return to their home countries eventually. Since
the subject matter of this study are at times divisive issues, we want to stress that our
results should be interpreted as short-term eects.
While our results oer useful indications for long-term eects, they are certainly
not the last word on this important issue. Given the contentiousness of the debate,
we encourage more research on this topic. The natural experiment presented by the
refugee inows provides a useful setting to evaluate their eects and design evidence-
based policies. We hope that this paper provides a conclusive and convincing analysis of
the short-term eects of the refugee crisis in Germany and can serve as a starting point
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Refugee Allocations to Counties and EAE Capacities
County Allocations
Federal Quota total percent EAE capacities
Baden-Wuertemberg 12.8% 105,680 11.5% 26,400
Bavaria 15.5% 106,763 11.6% 22,377
Berlin 5.1% 67,228 7.3% n/a
Brandenburg 3.1% 30,930 3.4% 5,092
Bremen 1.0% 12,507 1.4% n/a
Hamburg 2.5% 28,937 3.1% n/a
Hesse 7.4% 57,575 6.3% 22,047
Mecklenburg Western Pomerania 2.0% 22,614 2.5% 989
Lower Saxony 9.3% 84,475 9.2% 5,028
Northrhine-Westphalia (NRW) 21.2% 224,589 24.4% 16,245
Rhineland Palatinate 4.8% 34,999 3.8% 10,622
Saarland 1.2% 13,265 1,4% 1,300
Saxony 5.1% 41,423 4.5% 16,845
Saxony-Anhalt 2.8% 27,736 3.0% 6,259
Schleswig-Holstein 3.4% 36,500 4.0% 15,667
Thuringia 2.7% 24,657 2.7% 6,951
Total 100.0% 919,878 100.0% 148,414
Table relates federal quota (\Koenigssteiner Schluessel") of migrants who are supposed to be allocated to
the states to the number of refugees forwarded by states to their subordinate counties and the capacities
that exist to house refugees in state-run reception centers (EAEs). Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg are
city states and have no subordinate counties, hence no distinction between refugees that are housed by
counties and those in state-run facilities is possible. In the data the EAE capacities are coded as zero for









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Potential Determinants of Refugee Inows
Regression
Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Housing Vacancies 4.709 8.6516 -4.0070
(21.698) (11.3353) (15.2865)
GDP per Capita 30.993 -0.0000 0.0033*
(13.265) (0.0013) (0.0018)
Average Age 43.58 23.6200* 22.5817
(1.708) (13.2445) (17.7066)
Share Migration Background 16.74 -5.6940** -8.9686**
(9.498) (2.6694) (3.6465)
Percentage Degree 73.63 756.9438 171.5604
(5.599) (659.4232) (744.1184)
Observations 402 402 402 402 402 402
R-squared 0.2648 0.2637 0.2697 0.2723 0.2662 0.2830
State-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:   =  = indicate signicance at the 1%/5%/10%-level. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
Each column is a separate county-level regression of the number of refugees (per 100,000) allocated to a county on county character-
istics (as per Zensus 2011). All estimates are adjusted for state xed eects, each county receives the same weight. Housing vacancies
are the number of empty living spaces per 1,000 inhabitants, GDP per Capita is measured in e1000, average age is the average age
per county, % migration background is the percentage of county population with a migration background (includes ethnic Germans
who emigrated from the former Sowjet Union after the fall of the iron curtain), % College/Degree is the share of the population with











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Placebo Regressions: Inows of Refugees and Change in Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Unemployment Crime
General Youth Non-German German All Crimes Street Crimes Drug Oenses
refugees  0:0000 0:0001 0:0001  0:0000  0:2944  0:0694  0:0149
(0:0001) (0:0001) (0:0003) (0:0001) (0:0809) (0:0291) (0:0116)
EAEcap  0:0001  0:0001 0:0001  0:0001 0:1384  0:0109 0:0104
(0:0001) (0:0001) (0:0002) (0:0001) (0:0794) (0:0293) (0:0102)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 402 402 402 402 402 402 402
R-squared 0.2267 0.0852 0.0425 0.2158 0.1119 0.0517 0.0224
Notes:   =  = indicate signicance at the 1%/5%/10%-level. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
Each column reports coecients and standard errors from a county level OLS regression as shown in equation 2, but based on
data from 2013 and 2011 respectively. Refugee inows and reception center (EAE) capacities were set to 2014/15 aggregates
(both per 100,000). The outcome variables are the general unemployment rate, the unemployment rate for 15 to 25-year olds,
the unemployment rate for workers who are not German citizens, the number of crimes, the number of street crimes, and the
number of drug oenses (all three per 100,000 population). Covariates are all county-specic and include housing vacancies
(per 1,000 inhabitants), per capita GDP (in e), average age, share of population with migration background, and share of




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Refugee Arrivals and Asylum Claims Filed
Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior and Federal Oce for Migration and Refugees
Notes: This graph plots the number of asylum applications that were led and the number of new arrivals
to Germany as they were entered into the federal registration system, EASY, between January 2014 and
April 2016. The total for 2015 is 1,091,984 EASY entries, for 2014 it is 238,676.
38
Figure 2: Refugee Allocations per County
Source: State Ministries of the Interior or similar concerned state-level authorities
Notes: Maps show all 402 German counties, the inux of refugees into these counties per 100,000 and
changes in the main outcomes of interests between 2013 and 2015/16. Stars indicate the presence of a
registration center (EAE).
39
Figure 3: Refugees and Change in Outcomes by County
(a) Inux of Refugees (b) Change in Unemployment Rate
(c) Change in Number of Crimes (d) Change in AfD Vote Share
Source: State Ministries of the Interior or similar concerned state-level authorities
Notes: Maps show all 402 German counties, the inux of refugees into these counties and changes in
the main outcomes of interests between 2013 and 2015/16. Stars indicate the presence of a registration
center (EAE). Note that the map on the top right is identical to Figure 2. Maps (a) and (c) are per
100,000 inhabitants.
40
Figure 4: Unemployment Rates Over Time
Source: Federal Employment Agency
Notes: This gure shows quarterly unemployment rates (1/2005 - 1/2016) separately by low and high
migration counties. High migration counties were allocated more than 1,305 refugees (per 100,000) or host
a reception center (EAE) with at least 200 beds. The bottom two lines show the general unemployment
rate, the top two lines show unemployment among the non-German population.
41
Figure 5: Crime Rates Over Time
(a) All Crimes
(b) Street Crimes and Drug Crimes
Source: Federal Criminal Police Oce (BKA)
Notes: This gure shows annual crime rates (2005-2015) separately by low and high migration counties.
High migration counties were allocated more than 1,305 refugees (per 100,000) or host a reception center
(EAE) with at least 200 beds. The top two lines illustrate the number of street crimes (per 100,000),
the bottom two lines show the number of drug related crimes (per 100,000).
42
Figure 6: National AfD Party Polls
Source: Forsa
Notes: These are national polls for the AfD party over time. The left vertical line is placed at the date of
the latest federal election (22 September 2013) and the value at this point reects the actual percentage
of votes cast for the AfD party. All other measures of AfD popularity are based on polls contacted by
the polling institute Forsa and are based on surveys of about 1,000 participants. The dashed vertical line
to the right is placed on 5 September 2015 which is widely seen as the beginning of the refugee crisis.
43
Figure 7: Number of Non-German Unemployed and Unemployed from Crisis Countries
Source: Federal Employment Agency
Notes: This graph plots the number of Non-German citizens who have registered for unemployment
benets with the Federal Employment Agency (left-handside y-axis). It also plots the number of citizens
from the eight most common countires of origin for refugees (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan,
Nigeria, Eritrea, and Somalia) on the right-handside y-axis. Note that the data underlying this graph
are based on a dierent denition of unemployment than the data in the previous graphs and tables.
The data here include workers who are taking part in active labor market policy programs, such as
requalications and other government programs.
44
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